Dimensions of Research and Innovation Policies to Address Grand and Global Challenges by Kallerud, Egil et al.
Dimensions of Research and 
Innovation Policies to Address Grand 
and Global Challenges 
 
  
Egil Kallerud, Effie Amanatidou, Paul Upham, Mika 
Nieminen, Antje Klitkou, Dorothy Sutherland Olsen, 
Maria Lima Toivanen, Juha Oksanen, Lisa Scordato 
Working Paper 13/2013 
 

  
Dimensions of Research and 
Innovation Policies to Address Grand 
and Global Challenges 
 
  
Egil Kallerud, Effie Amanatidou, Paul Upham, Mika 
Nieminen, Antje Klitkou, Dorothy Sutherland Olsen, 
Maria Lima Toivanen, Juha Oksanen, Lisa Scordato 
Working Paper 13/2013 
 
  
Working paper 13/2013 
Published by  Nordisk institutt for studier av innovasjon, forskning og utdanning 
Address PB 5183 Majorstuen, NO-0302 Oslo. Besøksadresse: Wergelandsveien 7, 0167 Oslo 
Partners  Manchester Business School; VTT  
  
Oppdragsgiver Eu-SPRI Forum for Studies of Policies for Research and Innovation 
Adresse P.O. Box 217, 7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlands 
 www.nifu.no 
 
  
Preface 
This report is the position paper from an “exploratory initiative” project supported by the 
European Forum for Studies of Polices for Research and Innovation (Eu SPRI, 
http://www.euspri-forum.eu/ ). The project, called “The emergence of challenge-driven 
priorities in research and innovation policy” (CPRI), was a collaboration between researchers 
from NIFU, Norway (Egil Kallerud, Antje Klitkou, Dorothy Sutherland Olsen, Lisa Scordato), 
Manchester Business School, UK (Effie Amanatidou), University of Leeds, UK (Paul 
Upham), and VTT, Finland (Mika Nieminen, Maria Lima Toivanen, Juha Oksanen). The 
project was co-ordinated by Egil Kallerud, NIFU, who is corresponding author 
(egil.kallerud@nifu.no). An identical version of the position paper is published on the Eu 
SPRI website (http://www.euspri-forum.eu/key_missions/exploratory_initiatives.doc/) .  
Oslo, August 2013 
Sveinung Skule 
Director 
  
  
 
 1 
 
 
Contents 
A new discourse in research and innovation policy .................................................. 2 
Articulating the question: “a new paradigm or old wine in new bottles?” .............. 2 
Mapping diversity, ambiguities and tensions  ............................................................ 4 
Methodology ........................................................................................................ 5 
Main policy dimensions  ................................................................................................ 5 
1 Framing (rhetorics) ........................................................................................... 5 
2 Scale of stakes ................................................................................................. 7 
3 Supra-national scope ....................................................................................... 9 
4 Scale of effort ................................................................................................... 9 
5 Thematic variety and centrality ....................................................................... 10 
6 Thematic scope .............................................................................................. 13 
7 Temporal scope .............................................................................................. 13 
8 Multi-objective policy  ..................................................................................... 14 
9 Orientation and steering ................................................................................. 17 
10 Interactional mode (collaboration/competition) ............................................ 18 
11 STI spectrum  ............................................................................................... 18 
12 Stakeholder involvement  ............................................................................. 18 
13 Governance  ................................................................................................. 19 
Towards a matrix for benchmarking challenge-driven R&I policies?  ................... 19 
References .................................................................................................................... 21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
A new discourse in research and innovation policy  
The notion that research and innovation should address major societal challenges, generally 
with the added epithets “grand” and/or “global”, has become salient in contemporary 
research and innovation (R&I) policy. One notable example is the increasing centrality and 
extended use of the “grand challenges” term in recent EU policy developments.  It was 
officially  introduced in the so-called “rationale report” from 2008 (EUC, 2008), and soon 
became incorporated in official EU policy discourse through, in particular, the Lund 
declaration (July 2009), and has hence become implemented  in as emergent EU research 
and innovation policies, in particular as one of three main pillars of the Horizon 2020 
programme. Other influential international organizations promote similar notions about 
addressing global challenges through R&I. The OECD “Innovation Strategy” from 2010 
(OECD, 2010) included a chapter on “applying innovation to global and societal challenges” 
and the topic of a recent OECD report is how to upscale and enhance the governance of 
international cooperation in science, technology and innovation to address global challenges 
(OECD, 2012). The Royal Society has added its voice to calls for improving and scaling up 
international co-operation in science, technology and innovation to address global 
challenges (Royal Society, 2011). It is also part of official US R&I policy, where “harnessing 
science and technology to address the “grand challenges” of the 21st century” is one of the 
goals of president Obama’s 2009 Strategy for American Innovation. This list can be 
expanded to include other organizations, regions and nations, where the (grand) challenges 
notion has come into common use in the way overall policy goals and rationales for 
supporting and mobilising research and innovation are being framed.  
Articulating the question: “a new paradigm or old wine in new bottles?” 
The distinct emergence of both the term and notion of societal/grand/global challenges in 
R&I policy discourse is taken by many to indicate that “something new” is emerging in R&I 
policy, i.e., new ways of framing the missions of R&I, new goals and priorities, new 
approaches to collaboration and to governance, new instruments etc. As long as the notion 
remains indeterminate and incompletely developed, and the term is being used in divergent 
meanings, in ever new contexts, and in increasingly elliptic and parasitic ways, it seems 
difficult or impossible to be specific about what its novelty is, exactly, in what respects and in 
relation to what it is new, without making more or less explicit normative selections of one or 
a few exemplary or “paradigmatic” cases of “genuine” challenge-driven priorities or 
approaches. This may be the case for some analytical attempts to pinpoint how 
(grand/global) challenge approach-based R&I policies differ from previous, well-established 
and well-documented approaches in R&I policy. Some have characterized as “a new 
mission-led approach” (Gassler, Polt, & Rammer, 2008) which exhibit major differences 
compared to “systems of innovation” approaches. According to this analysis, the rise of the 
national system of innovation framework in the 1980s led to a systems-oriented approach 
which emphasized functional and generic aspects. They see now a shift towards a new 
approach oriented around the development of technologies for coping with new societal 
challenges like demographic change, ageing society, (global) health care concerns, security, 
environmental and sustainability issues etc.  
In another analysis, the “recent policy debates about research, technology and innovation 
towards societal challenges, rather than economic growth only” is seen to indicate the 
emergence of a new type of policy for “transformative change” (Weber and Rohracher, 
2012). Policies for transformative change do not only address “failures” as defined within 
systemic innovation policy frameworks, i.e., infrastructural, institutional, interactional and 
capability failures; one needs to add a new type of failure, viz. directional failures: policies for 
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transformative change not only require that innovations be generated as efficiently and 
effectively as possible, but also that these innovations contribute to a particular direction of 
transformative change. This involves, inter alia, the identification of major societal problems 
or challenges for which solutions need to be developed with the help of research and 
innovation, the formation of collective priorities and the development of shared visions.  This 
framing of the turn towards social challenges indicates a central role for such frameworks as 
transition management, multi-level governance and co-evolution of social, institutional and 
technological systems.  
As Gassler et al. (2008), Mowery, Nelson and Martin (Mowery, et al., 2010) characterize R&I 
policy to meet the global climate as a form of mission-oriented policy. The novelty of this type 
of mission-orientation is spelled out by comparing and contrasting it to the type of mission-
orientation that was characteristic of such mission-oriented projects as the Manhattan project 
and the Apollo programme. While the latter were designed, funded, and managed by federal 
agencies to achieve a specific technological solution for which the government was 
effectively the sole ‘customer’, technological solutions to global climate change must be 
deployed throughout the world by many different actors, and these deployment decisions will 
require huge outlays of private as well as public funds” (Mowery, et al., 2010, p. 1012). The 
“high degree of administrative centralisation” of these mission-oriented projects contrasts 
with the new challenges, which require that a large number of heterogeneous actor groups 
have to develop, produce and deploy a large variety of technological solutions in a diverse 
array of sectors throughout the world, not just inside the realm of one nation. The dominant 
supply-side research policies of earlier mission-oriented projects will also not work in 
programmes for addressing climate change, where technology policy has to be supple-
mented with demand-side policies aimed at changing human behaviour and halting the 
increasing demand for energy and degradation of biodiversity.  
These are some initial attempts to capture in analytical terms what appears to be new in the 
emergent R&I policy debates and developments linked to the notion of grand/global 
challenges. No doubt, they capture important aspects of that novelty. But by taking their 
point of departure from within a given analytical framework, their perception of novelty may 
as much stem from limitations of the analytical framework itself as from “real” novelties. This 
is, e.g., self-reflexively noted in the introduction to the Research Policy special issue on “The 
need for a new generation of policy instruments to respond to the Grand Challenges” 
(Volume 41, Issue 10, Pages 1697-1792), 1  
Much of the economics literature on these policy issues [social challenges] focuses on 
public support of R&D as a response to “market failures.” Although market failures are 
clearly present in many of the current challenges, economists have tended to overlook 
the significance of R&D support programs that are focused on specific objectives, in spite 
of the size and significance within most industrial-economy public R&D budgets of these 
programs. More generally, scholars writing about science and technology policy have 
                                                     
1 “[Cu]rrent discussions of R&D policy responses to today's social challenges have proceeded with little 
awareness of these programs, except for Manhattan and Apollo. Much of the economics literature on these 
policy issues focuses on public support of R&D as a response to “market failures.” Although market failures 
are clearly present in many of the current challenges, economists have tended to overlook the significance of 
R&D support programs that are focused on specific objectives, in spite of the size and significance within 
most industrial-economy public R&D budgets of these programs. More generally, scholars writing about 
science and technology policy have largely focused on measures intended to stimulate overall economic 
growth. And scholars doing research on the role and nature of public R&D in support of particular sectors and 
objectives like national defense, or public health, or agriculture have tended to publish their work in 
specialized journals that are unfamiliar to most readers of Research Policy.” (Foray et al, 2012, p. 1697, 
italics added). 
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largely focused on measures intended to stimulate overall economic growth. (Foray et al, 
2012, p. 1697, italics here) 
A next step in this type of self-reflexive program for developing a framework for 
understanding and analysing these R&I policies may, then, be to resume and incorporate up 
to now neglected knowledge from, i.a., other fields of study about public R&D programs (as 
seen in the quoted special issue of Research Policy). Again, this “re-discovery” may no 
doubt be a necessary step in the re-articulation of dominant policy analytical frameworks, but 
one question is, how far state-of-the-art knowledge about national R&D programs can go in 
capturing the specificity and novelty of challenge-driven R&I policies if one of their key is 
their supra-national scope (which is one of our arguments below).  
These few references indicate some strategies that are being developed to capture and 
conceptualise what appears to be new in the emergent, distinctive discourse on challenge-
driven R&I policy. We make in this paper an argument for a more cautious and circumvent 
approach, emphasizing the need to “follow the (policy) actors”, tracing and describing how 
policies are framed, justified and implemented in terms of responses to grand and global 
challenges. Hence, we refrain from making premature claims from a vantage point within 
established analytical frameworks about the “really” new of these discourses and policies. 
Thus, as the uses and meanings of the term in R&I policy contexts at global, regional and 
national levels multiply, we think it is useful to develop a broader empirical and conceptual 
basis for describing and assessing the strength and direction(s) of the drivers of innovation 
and change in these developments, recognising in particular that drivers of novelty and 
innovation as well as processes of capture and co-optation are involved. Understanding the 
interplay and relative strength of these drivers is, according to our argument, an essential 
part of the basis on which answers may be given to questions such as: to what extent, in 
what respects substantive reorientation taking place in developments of challenge-driven 
R&I policies, and, inversely, in what ways and to what extent are they subject to co-optation 
and capture, by which impulses of innovation are being diverted?  
Mapping diversity, ambiguities and tensions 
If there may be ample basis for claims that real change is involved, the situation presents 
itself prima facie as one where the grand/global challenge terms are used with multiple 
meanings by different actors and in different contexts, increasingly so in all respects as it is 
being picked in a bandwagon-like effect. The (increasingly) multiple and heterogeneous uses 
of the challenge term derive partly from the wide thematic range of the different challenges 
involved: climate change, clean energy, food security, aging societies, biodiversity, terrorism, 
health (in poor countries, pandemics), poverty/inequality, clean water, etc. The list is in 
principle open, as no well-defined and authoritative thematic criteria are given as to what 
candidate challenges may appropriately be considered as sufficiently “major” to count as 
grand and/global. There seems to be a multitude of meanings and uses of the grand 
challenge term, - sometimes diverging to an extent that make them mutually incompatible, 
sometimes indication of convergent uses that may form the nuclei of emergent coherent 
conceptual frameworks. As a weakly defined term used in multiple meanings and for 
different purposes, it lends itself to uses by actors for framing problems in ways which make 
their contribution appear as key to their resolution, leaving open if “challenges” in such cases 
function as “garbage cans” or as “boundary objects”. These developments may thus be 
structured by tensions between, on the one hand, processes of re-labelling of policy 
objectives, priorities and instruments that remain largely unchanged, while in other cases 
they may reflect a genuine drive for policy change, innovation and learning. 
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Methodology. As the number and variety of uses and developments of the grand/global 
challenges term and notion in R&I policy contexts rapidly increases, it becomes impossible 
to make an exhaustive map of these developments. Hence, making choices about which 
documents and cases warrant being highlighted as seminal and exemplary is inevitable. A 
choice has to be made of documents and policy developments that are accorded a 
“privileged” status as authoritative and seminal, as sources where the very notion of a 
challenge-driven policy approach is developed and set down. This privileged status may in 
principle be confirmed on the basis of, e.g., the documented number of references and 
citations received. The OECD Innovation Strategy and key EU communications about the 
rationale and structure of Horizon 2020 2 are obvious examples of documents which would 
be found to qualify as of privileged status on that basis. This may thus justify their use as 
sources and main steps in the development of key criteria and standards of what a 
challenge-driven policy approach “appropriately” is and should be.  While we have in our 
subsequent analysis accorded some policy documents and initiatives a privileged status, 
these choices are not made nor justified on such strict basis, but on the basis of a shared, 
largely implicit understanding of overall international policy debates and developments within 
our field. At the other end of the spectrum, there is a huge number of specific uses of the 
term and notion, uses that are often highly elliptic, thus drawing on the authority and 
reflecting the rhetorical impact of seminal documents and developments. These may indicate 
the diffusion of the term and notion, without claiming the normative authority that of the 
seminal documents and uses, against which the “authenticity” of these “derivative” uses may 
be assessed.      
Assigning, then, a certain normative authority to what is at this explorative stage a loosely 
delimited number of seminal documents and developments, we may trace the emergence of 
some recurring issues in these developments. They form the basis for an emergent core of 
policy dimension that are, explicitly or implicitly, key in discussions and uses of the challenge 
term within R&I policy contexts. The rest of this paper is a first step in trying to identify and 
describe these core dimensions, as a point of departure for developing an analytical 
framework by which the application in R&I policy contexts of the grand/global challenges 
term and notion may be characterized in terms of “location” along dimensions which make 
up constitute this analytical space. We do not only look at “discourse” (documents, 
statements) in the narrow sense of the terms, but also at discourse is embedded in practice, 
i.e., funding, governance, design of instruments etc.  
Main policy dimensions  
1. Framing (rhetorics). The introduction of the language of “challenges” are sometimes 
justified in explicit rhetorical terms, as seen in particular in the 2008 report of the 
Rationale Expert Group to the EUC. The group propose the “grand challenge” 
approach to reframe overall EU research policy. It is argued that it is more effective 
than the 2000 Lisbon strategy in rhetorical terms, i. e., as a means to “capture the 
imagination of publics, politicians and stakeholders”. In framing EU research policy in 
terms of responding to grand challenges, it provides an image or presentation of 
ERA policy that may positively affect the perceptions of the public and stakeholders. 
It redresses the failure of the overall ERA rationale of the 2000 Lisbon strategy which 
focused on “remedies for perceived failures in the research system”, in casu 
fragmentation and deficit (Barcelona target). In contrast, “[t]his report presents a 
rationale for a European Research Area that has a clear purpose which is 
meaningful to Europe’s citizens and political leaders and relevant to its key actors. 
                                                     
2 In particular COM(2011) 808 final: Horizon 2020 - The Framework Programme for Research and 
Innovation. 
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While there is a pressing need to improve the effectiveness of the public research 
system, the ultimate justification of the resources and commitment needed to 
achieve this lies in increasing the value of the contribution that public and private 
sector research makes, and is seen to make, to Europe’s economic, social and 
environmental goals.” (p. 4, italics in the original). The rhetorical dimension is also 
salient in other reports in the EU policy process, as seen, e.g., by its use to sustain, 
e.g., the “new renaissance” of ERAB reports. The rhetorical dimension of challenge-
oriented policies may be more or less explicit in specific uses. It may often be highly 
explicit in general policy documents, here often used to structure and justify overall 
policy orientation, structure and priorities. This dimension may be more implicitly 
present, when it is used elliptically and “derivatively”, without much explicit rhetorical 
content, thus implicitly borrowing authority from the positive connotations and  
general adoption of the term in general policy discourse.  
 
 
  
Box 1: 
As part of the study was conducted an analysis of the strategy documents and annual 
reviews of three major Finnish science, technology and innovation policy organizations: 
Research and Innovation Council, Tekes – the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology 
and Innovation, and the Academy of Finland. The analysis focused on documents from 
the mid-1990s to the present.  
The analysis of the documents of the three agencies indicated that the themes which are 
currently called “Grand Challenges” or the ways their nature is understood are not new 
ones in the STI policy.  
For instance, environment has been a longstanding issue in the policymaking. It has only 
increased its significance over the years and the issue has become increasingly nuanced 
and manifold. Environment was not either a rhetoric aspect in the policy documents. For 
instance, the funding of environmental technologies developed positively already in the 
beginning of 1990s. Between 1992-1995 the rise in Tekes funding was approximately 
75%. Already in 2002 Tekes also released a strategy, in which it defined explicitly global 
challenges, which act as drivers for societal development. The strategy also connected 
various macro-level societal trends together in order to argue for certain actions or 
technological developments.  It was understood that the trends were “systemic” by nature 
and they were connected to several aspects in our living environment. “Grand 
Challenges” were presented as “drivers” or “trends” that affect profoundly to our natural 
and social environment, which meant, in turn, that systemic policy measures has to be 
developed to tackle these problems. It was stated e.g. that:  
- “Technological development may bring along social inequality, which must be taken into 
consideration in the development of educational and social services. Regional 
differences are also likely to be highlighted.” 
- “International cooperation is necessary in environmental and safety issues, the steering 
of the market economy as well as in the improvement in the conditions of slowly 
developing countries.” 
- “Globalisation brings along social challenges and problems in interaction between 
various population groups and cultures. (…) It must be ensured that the development of 
technology is planned and controlled to promote welfare. Tensions between the 
approaches of different cultures, population groups and political attitudes must also be 
prevented from creating social and security problems.” (Tekes 2002, 7) 
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2. Scale of stakes. Discourse on challenge-driven policies often emphasize the high, 
even extreme, stakes in the search for effective solutions to challenges. These are 
challenges that are grand, often alleged to be truly “existential” in nature and scale. 
In this respect, the global warming/clean energy challenges clearly lead the way. 
Thus the challenge discourse follows earlier “life and death” rationales of R&I 
policies (winning the cold war; “life-saving” medical progress; “survival” of firms and 
national economies in the increasingly competitive global economy etc). The Royal 
Society report talks about “significant threats to societies and ecosystems”. 
However, with the diffusion (and dilution) of the challenge discourse, examples may 
often be found of its application to issues that are, arguably, of a less “grand” nature, 
as concern the stakes involved, hardly exceeding those of “normal” problems, often 
with merely nominal connection to challenges that are generally recognised to be 
grand in scale.  
 
 
 
Grand or global? While the notion “grand challenges” has become ubiquitous in 
European R&I policy, other players (the OECD, Royal Society) prefer the “global” 
term, which more explicitly link this approach to processes and issues of 
“globalization”, both in terms of stakes, thematic focus and interactional 
requirements (international cooperation). However, the similarity and overlap 
between the notions of grand and global challenges is extensive, as, e.g., 
emphasized in the following statement in the EU Innovation Union: “many if not all of 
the societal challenges on which Europe's research and innovation efforts must 
focus are also global. Overcoming many of these challenges calls for worldwide 
sharing of efforts. In particular, many major research infrastructures require massive 
investments that can only be raised through global cooperation.” (COM(2010) 546 
final, p. 27). Both grand and global challenges are, however, “societal” (see quote 
Box 2: 
In the stock-taking exercise under the VERA (Visions for ERA) project (see footnote 3), the 
novelty of the ‘grand challenges’ concept or the extent of (re)framing it to the current policy 
debates appears to be of less importance in the documents studied1. The concept is 
primarily used to establish rationales for policy interventions. It could be argued that in the 
EU strategic policy documents and to some extent the forward – looking activities (FLAs) of 
international scope the concept is used as a means to capture the imagination of publics, 
politicians and stakeholders so as to align and orient efforts towards the achievement of 
specific goals that serve the public good. Interestingly the concept seems to serve the 
needs and interests of all different cohorts (society, policy, business) the least from a 
communicational aspect. Thus, a ‘promotional’ or ‘normative’ tone can be identified in 
these documents in terms of the need to tackle the grand challenges addressed. Following 
the EU vocabulary, FLAs on national research priorities may also have a similar 
promotional character. Beyond the surface however the focus is placed on the particular 
circumstances facing each country and how the (grand) challenges are interpreted in the 
local contexts. This is true primarily for EU countries. In other parts of the world (India, 
China, Brazil) the ‘grand challenges’ rhetoric is less profound. FLAs with a specific sectoral 
focus may follow the ‘grand challenges’ approach in establishing policy rationales but they 
also give a more pragmatic approach to the relevant discussions by going deeper to 
understand the particularities of specific challenges for specific sectors in defining possible 
strategic (technology) roadmaps.  
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above; OECD, 2010, Chapter 6: “Applying innovation to societal and global 
challenges”), see dimension 9 below.3 
 
 
                                                     
3 70 docs were reviewed under the VERA project (http://eravisions.eu/) in relation to how grand challenges are 
discussed. This list included ERA governance related policy documents, European forward-looking activities 
(FLAs) addressing the future of ERA, FLAs in national R&I priorities, FLAs on important European sectors like IT, 
agriculture, security, transportation, energy and new emerging technologies and FLAs of international scope. The 
review of these documents addressed the ways grand challenges or issues associated with grand challenges 
were discussed. More specifically, information was retrieved in relation to the thematic areas of the challenges 
discussed, the explanations of justifications of the challenges, the aspects implied in relation to ERA and R&I 
governance, and the associated scenarios and solutions suggested. 
Box 3: 
While the requirement for some form and degree of formal multilateral cooperation and 
collaboration are in some cases explicitly part of the definition of grand/global challenge-
driven R&I policy approaches, national policymakers may assign the now rhetorically 
laudable epithet “addressing global challenges” to extant national programmes and priorities, 
without requiring much change in the collaborative framework for pursuing the objectives of 
the priority ion question. This applies to a large part of those Norwegian policies that are 
explicitly framed and justified in terms of addressing global challenges. The most important 
policy innovation in the 2009 Norwegian White Paper on research policy 
(Kunnskapsdepartementet, 2009) was the introduction of “global challenges” as a new, 
overall thematic priority. The reframing of a number of general thematic priorities as “global 
in scope and approach may be seen to be the major innovation in that White Paper, seen 
against the background of stability and only incremental change in overall national R (&I) 
policies. Its use in reframing the overall profile and structure of national research policy, may 
thus be seen as a case of stroing rhetorical impact. The recently published 2013 White 
Paper on research policy makes no change in this respect.  
However, the strong impact on the rhetorical dimension is not matched by much change in 
actual policies. The “global challenges” priorities of the 2009 and 2013 White Papers 
encompass topics such as climate, energy, protection of biodiversity, oceans/marine 
research and food security, many of which were already established thematic priorities with 
their own, (mostly) national programmes, before the White Paper was published. These 
policies and programmes can in practice hardly be seen to have changed much since 2009, 
either in terms of funding, organization and scope.  
One exception to this is, however, the emergence of a strong climate/energy priority: a 
Climate Agreement  from 2008 between all political parties in the Parliament led to a steep 
increase in funding from 2008 to 2010 for clean energy research (and innovation) and (to a 
less extent) for climate research. These developments did not, however, include much 
change in terms of the actual global scope and supranational organization of the supported 
efforts. Most of the increased funds for energy research was distributed between various 
branches of the national energy industry on the basis of a national strategy (Energy21), 
developed in corporatist collaboration between the affected industries themselves and the 
research communities that serve them. That strategy was criticized for having neglected 
altogether the global scope of the effort, taking the interests of affected interests more into 
account than concerns with how policies could make the most effective contribution to the 
global climate/energy challenge.  
Another related change is that Norway decided to take part in all ten European JPIs, if to 
highly variable extents in the various JPIs. The Seas and Oceans JPI has highest priority, 
where Norway is one of the leading/coordinating countries. This priority corresponds well 
with the established national marine/maritime priority, which was (at least part of it) reframed 
and re-categorized in the 2009 White Paper as one of the global challenges. This may be 
seen as one step towards a stronger commitment to redesigning at least one thematic 
priority for its further development within a supranational, collaborative context.  
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3. Supranational scope. The importance of international collaboration and joint supra-
national efforts are emphasized in many initiatives that are framed in the terms of 
addressing grand/global challenges. In some versions, international collaboration is 
integral to their very definition, as, e.g., in the OECD innovation strategy: “global 
challenges are defined by the need to cooperate on a global scale” (italics added) 
(OECD, 2010). Grand and, in particular, global challenges affect by definition more 
than one nation and cannot adequately be addressed within the constraints of 
national policy frameworks. As this is arguably the by far dominant political context of 
R&I policy development and implementation, this could imply a call for radical 
change in the way R&I policy is framed, organized and implemented.  The grand/ 
global challenges straddles national boundaries, they affect “everyone”, so it is, in 
the common interest for all populations in “all” nations and regions of the world that 
they be resolving through a common effort. The supra-national scope and nature of 
the challenge in question may also imply that addressing and resolving them effect-
ively require, by definition, much more extensive and effective international collabor-
ation and coordination at the organizational and policy levels (not only at the 
performing level): “Global challenges are defined by the need to co-operate world-
wide to create a public good (mitigation of climate change, health) or protect the 
global commons (the environment, fisheries)”. (OECD, 2010: 165, italics added). 
“Global challenge science looks set to increase in terms of importance, scale and 
impact. It requires international co-operation on a large scale because of the nature 
and magnitude of the potential consequences of these problems. No one country or 
scientific discipline will be able to offer complete solutions.” (Royal Society, 2012: 
72). Which propels the issue into to the challenging and complex field of multilateral 
international collaboration in science, technology and – now even – innovation.  
 
The same applies to the introduction of the grand challenges  approach into the 
overall framework of European R&I policy framework, adding essentially a rationale 
for the role of the EU as framework for collaboration, coordination and pooling 
resources over and above the limitations of what member states can achieve within 
the constraints of their respective national policy contexts. Hence, addressing grand 
and global challenges only or predominantly within national R&I policies could, 
according to this definition, be seen as a contradictio in adjecto. While the 
requirement for some form and degree of formal multilateral cooperation and 
collaboration is inherent in this definition of grand and global challenges, this does 
not prevent national policymakers from assigning, by re-labelling, the laudable 
epithet “addressing global challenges” to programmes and priorities the scope of 
which remain exclusively national, without adding any significant elements of formal 
collaboration or explicit coordination across national borders. 
 
4. Scale of effort. This is the verso of the supranational scope of grand/global 
challenge-oriented R&I policies. For such challenges to be effectively addressed, 
more intellectual and monetary resources are required than what single actors, even 
large nations, can muster alone. This point is particularly clearly stated in the ERA 
rationale group: while EU framework programmes already encompass programmes 
that address issues such as clean energy, food, health, demography etc, a shift 
towards a challenges approach implies that a few efforts and programmes should be 
considerably up-scaled so as to reflect the much higher stakes involved in those 
particular cases than for any “normal” mission-oriented R&I effort. The rationale 
report emphasises the high scale of stakes and the extreme up-scaling of efforts 
required: taking the European Strategic Energy Technology SET-Plan as “exemplary 
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response to a grand challenge”, it argues that “with grand challenges potentially 
costing 5 billion € to 10 billion € each, it is hard to see Europe affording more than 
three or four at a time even within an increased budget” (Nature, op cit., p. 936). As 
we now know, as many as ten JPIs have been selected, probably with more to 
come, launched as efforts to respond to “major societal challenges” (COM(208) 468 
final).  
The ERA rationale report weaves together the framing, scale and scope dimensions 
(dimensions 1-3) in its summing up of its conceptualization of the grand challenge 
approach: “Grand Challenges should derive this name from the fact that they are of 
sufficient scale and scope to capture the public and political imagination, create 
widespread interest among scientific and business communities and NGOs and 
inspire younger people. They must be capable of acting as an important tool for 
percolating attention at all levels of society all the way down to civil society and the 
public at large. Grand Challenges should be few in number at any moment” 
(Rationale Report, p. 37). 
 
 
5. Thematic variety and centrality. While climate change, global warming and clean 
energy are issues that are always listed as grand and global challenges, it varies 
much more between context both which other topics qualify as grand/global 
challenges and how they are framed as challenges at those levels of stakes and 
efforts. We quote a few lists from a selection of arguably influential documents:  
EU documents: The Lund declaration: “sustainable solutions in areas such as (sic) 
global warming, tightening supplies of energy, water and food, ageing societies, 
public health, pandemics and security…. turning Europe into an eco-efficient 
economy”.  
Towards Joint Programming in Research, COM (2008) 468 final: “sustaining 
Europe's prosperity in the face of increased global competition; dealing with the 
needs of its ageing population and the challenges of immigration; and stimulating 
sustainable development, especially in the context of climate change, securing the 
supply of energy, preserving human and environmental health, ensuring food 
quality and availability as well as safeguarding citizen security”(p. 3).  
Box 4: 
This national – international clash can also be identified in the documents studied in the 
VERA stock-taking exercise. In FLAs of international scope where it is international 
organisations that are the key players, the approach in the discussions reflects the global 
scope of the challenges and need for international collaboration. The need for 
international collaboration as well as what this implies on current collaboration structures 
and attitudes is discussed particularly in relation to the challenges regarding health, 
ageing, migration, security,  and basic resources shortages. The need as well reluctance 
to delegate power at international level has been noted alongside the need to strengthen 
existing structures or create new ones.  
In contrast, cross-national collaboration is not strongly highlighted in national FLAs which 
may seek for example solutions to the energy shortages quite differently from other EU 
member states of other world regions Eventually it is national specificities and national 
strengths and interests that are reflected in the ways grand challenges are discussed, 
interpreted and proposed to deal with. This is natural for the national FLAs given that it is 
national institutions that are called to take action even if in coordination with counterparts 
from other countries.  
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EU JPIs: Healthy and Productive Seas and Oceans; JPI-Climate; More years, better 
lives; The microbial challenge – An emerging threat to human health; URBAN 
EUROPE - Global Challenges - Local Solutions; Water Challenges for a Changing 
World; Joint Programming Neurodegenerative Disease; Agriculture, Food Security 
& Climate Change; Cultural Heritage & Global Change; A Healthy Diet for a Healthy 
Life. 
 
OECD. OECD innovation strategy: “the effects of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
are universal, and any solutions that reduce these emissions will benefit all 
countries. Similarly, most infectious diseases have no regard for national borders, 
and new medicines can benefit many countries if they are affordable and 
accessible. High food prices and food security are also an important issue for 
Box 5: 
The analysis of the Finnish STI policy documents from the mid-1990s to the present 
suggests that the introduction of the Grand Challenges discourse in the EU did not 
change Finnish STI policy significantly. Tekes barely mentioned it in their documents, 
while Research and Innovation Policy Council have referred to different types of 
(societal, global) challenges  in their tri-annual review documents increasingly since the 
turn of the millennium – albeit usually in rather general terms and from distinctly national 
perspective.  The Academy of Finland paid some attention to it from the perspective of 
basic research. Apparently it did not, however, bring any new perspectives or 
instruments to the STI policy. The reason for this may be rather simple. As the themes 
which are now defined as grand challenges and related readily available policy 
instruments were already in use, the EU level policy discourse did not bring anything 
new to the policy making.  This suggests, in turn, that there may be significant variety 
among countries, how they interpret, obtain or utilize Grand Challenge “vocabulary”.   
In an appendix of the Review 2006 of the Research and Innovation Council (a strategy 
on internationalisation of Finnish science and technology 12.11.2004) there is paid 
attention to global problems and challenges in general terms as well as Finland’s 
responsibility in responding to them. At the outset of Review 2008 there is a direct 
reference to challenges understood in current discussion as grand ones:  “The field of 
ERI policy is experiencing a rapid change. The change factors recognised in the report 
on innovation policy submitted by the Government to the Parliament on 9 October 2008 
– globalisation, an ageing population and technological development, and concern over 
sustainable development – have an increasing effect on decision making pertaining to 
society and the economy. Policy measures must increasingly be connected with these 
changes, responding the challenges and utilising the opportunities opened up by them” 
(Review 2008, 8). The term ‘Grand Challenges’ is mentioned first time in the Review 
2010 as such. However, the concept is not discussed or assessed to any extent.  
Instead the  term ‘societal challenges’ is used a couple of times: “Major societal 
challenges that are faced by all countries, such as climate change, energy and food 
security, and the ageing of the population, require major investments, and, in the coming 
years, will guide national and international priorities in research and innovation policy. 
These challenges must be included as priorities in ERI policy guidelines, the allocation of 
resources and when developing actions. Finland must identify its own strengths, and 
resources must be combined to create new knowledge, expertise and business 
activities.” (Review 2010, 22) 
In general, the issues which might be related to Grand Challenges seemed to come to 
the fore particularly when changes in operational environment of Finland were 
discussed. The issues were, however, listed in rather sweeping manner giving an 
impression that concerns are well-known and shared by everyone.  
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developed as well as developing countries. (p. 165) Issues: “tackling climate 
change”; “global health challenges”; “(global) food security”.  
The STIG project: “security and sustainability of energy and the food supply, the 
threat of (re-)emerging infectious diseases, climate change and the loss of 
biodiversity (“are only a few”). Cases studied: food (CGIAR); global health (Gates 
Foundation); global (climate) change (GEO, Inter-American Institute for Global 
Change Research, IAI), energy (IAEA, IEA); [EU JPIs: “agriculture, food security 
and climate change”.  
Royal Society (2012): “… identified climate change, global health, food security, 
biodiversity, water security, population and energy security as humanity’s most 
pressing concerns. These are frequently referred to as ‘global challenges’ or ‘grand 
challenges’—those which transcend national boundaries and pose significant 
threats to societies and ecosystems.” (p. 72) Cases studied: global warming (IPCC); 
food security (CGIAR); global health (Gates Foundation); sustainable 
energy/TOKAMAK reactor (ITER); carbon capture and storage (CCS).  
US: President Obama address sept 2009: A Strategy for American Innovation: 
Driving towards Sustainable Growth and Quality Jobs: Harness science and 
technology to address the “grand challenges” of the 21st century. The President’s 
commitment to science and technology will allow the United States to set and meet 
ambitious goals, such as educational software that is as effective as a personal 
tutor and smart anti-cancer therapeutics that deliver drugs only to tumor cells….. (p. 
xx) “Finally, innovation is itself the key to meeting some of the greatest challenges 
facing our nation and the world. It will be pivotal to ending our dependence on fossil 
fuels, helping Americans live longer, healthier lives, and protecting our freedom and 
our troops both at home and abroad.” (p. 4) 
Lewis Branscomb, 2009 [Issues in Science and Technology]: “[Grand challenges 
are] technically complex societal problems that have stubbornly defied solutions”. 
“At or near the top of any list is the need to develop new energy sources that are 
clean, affordable, and reliable. The list also would include creating high-quality jobs 
for the nation’s population, finding cures for cancer, developing more effective ways 
of teaching and learning, identifying new ways to improve health and reduce the 
cost of care, improving the management of water resources, developing more 
nutritious foods and improving food safety, and speeding up the development of 
vaccines for deadly diseases, among others”.  
These are but a few examples of the lists that come with the grand/challenges 
rhetorics, indicating the highly flexible and loose use of the notion to include a wide 
variety of topics and efforts that may fall under that category. While some of the 
issues recur in virtually all such lists – global warming and clean energy in particular, 
often also global health, food security and demographic change – otherwise, the 
difference between list as to what topics are listed (very often with the open-ended 
“etc” at the end). The quasi-ubiquitous presence of global warning in all lists provides 
in particular a venue for many topics to be “sneaked into” its scope, (e.g., the 
“Cultural heritage – global change” JPI). While some key conceptualisations of 
grand/global challenges make an overall distinction between social/societal and 
economic challenges (see below), in other case the list includes objectives that have 
been core objectives of R&I policies targeting economic/ growth objectives (compe-
titive national economies, employment/high-quality jobs, etc, as in e.g., Obama’s 
statement above).  
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6. Thematic scope. In some conceptualizations, grand and global challenge-oriented 
policies deviate from established policies in defining a much wider and more open 
approach. In the Lund declaration this is a primary criterion in the definition of R&I 
policies predicated on the grand/ global challenge approach, providing as such an 
impetus to reform EU policies seen to be characterized by “rigid thematic 
approaches”: “European research must focus on the Grand Challenges of our time 
moving beyond current rigid thematic approaches.” The reform and innovation 
aspect of such a change is emphasized by calling for a “new deal” among European 
institutions and Member States.  Instead, “response to Grand Challenges should 
take the form of broad areas of issue-oriented research in relevant fields”. The ERA 
rationale report indicates similarly that within a reformed ERA approach predicated 
on the notion of grand challenges, “the first to go should be Framework Programmes 
that are divided into large numbers of small, very loosely connected projects defined 
years ahead by “work plans” with no clear providence” (Nature, 24 April 2008, p. 
936).  
 
There is, hence, an element 
in (some authoritative vers-
ions of) thinking about grand 
and global challenges as a 
basis for R&I policymaking 
which critically opens up and 
expands the framework of 
established “mission-orien-
ted”, thematic programmes 
and priorities, by calling for 
broader, more open and 
flexible approaches. This 
could be seen to provide a 
degree of specificity to the 
grand challenges notion, 
which would prevent a 
simple relabeling of all and 
any thematic programme etc 
as eo ipso addressing some 
(grand) challenge, even if 
the criterion of thematic 
identity or extensive thematic 
overlap is fulfilled.  
 
7. Temporal scope. The dimen-
sion of thematic scope links 
up that of temporal scope.  On the one hand, it is “urgent” to find solutions to 
pressing major challenges (as in the OECD STIG report), on the other, an open, 
long-term effort is required to produce the new scientific knowledge and the truly 
new and innovative technologies that may open up new venues for effective 
solutions. Hence, at least in some versions the role of basic research is strong. 4 
 
                                                     
4 See, e.g., the document “A Nordic contribution to the Grand Challenges debate”, which was a follow-up 
within the European Science Open Forum (ESOF) to the Lund Declaration.  
Box 6: 
The review of the 70 documents under the VERA 
project resulted in around 761 statements about grand 
challenges. These were then brought together based 
on intuitive judgments of the partner experts into 
specific clusters of grand challenges that then formed 
16 storylines about grand challenges. Like in the 
previous cases these storylines include all sorts of 
grand challenges in the social, economic and 
environmental domains:  
• uncertainty arising from a multipolar world,  
• increasing vulnerability of security due to 
increasing inter-connectedness,  
• values and attitudes that are changing globally,  
• traditional role of the state being challenged,  
• health concerns of an ageing society,  
• migration as consequence of other challenges,  
• education trying to cope with new demands,  
• health challenges in deprived regions,  
• climate change impacts on health,  
• risk of financial system failure,  
• current non-sustainable economic model,  
• difficulty in providing basic resources  
• scarcity in material sources,  
• current modes of energy supply and use 
threatening our survival,  
• strain that transportation systems face, and  
• shrinking EU competitiveness. 
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8. Multi-objective policy. Often the challenge approach is introduced and developed as 
concerned with “social/societal” and/or “public” issues, in contrast to approaches 
developed within the economic policy domain, focused on economic objectives, in 
particular economic growth, and primarily targeting “private” actors, i.e., private firms, 
their framework conditions and primary field of operation (markets). This distinction 
is particularly explicit and salient in some key documents where the notion is 
introduced as basis and impetus for policy innovation. It is, e.g., made very explicitly 
in the OECD Strategy (OECD, 2010), where it is stated that “this economic challenge 
[future growth for emerging economies] coincides with increasing pressure to meet 
various social challenges, such as climate change, health, food security, or access 
to clean water” (p. 9, italics here). According to that same strategy the objectives of 
global challenge-oriented initiatives is, by definition, to “create a public good (miti-
gation of climate change, health) or protect the global commons (the environment, 
fisheries)” (p. 165). Some form of distinction and difference between economic and 
social, private and public, market and “beyond the market” may thus be seen to 
sustain the very notion of grand and global challenge in almost all uses, as requiring 
in some form and degree a type of R&I policies that differ from those which primarily 
target economic objectives and actors.  
 
This difference and distinction is, however, by far clear-cut one. If the idea of a 
distinction between the social and (“merely”) economic objectives generally sustains 
the development of the differentia specifica of the challenge approach, that 
distinction does not take the form of an opposition between either/or alternatives. 
Addressing challenges will often and essentially require that economic objectives, 
including growth, be achieved, and that private companies are included as key 
partners, and that efficient markets must be created, and so on.  
One version of such a non-disjunctive distinction between policies to sustain growth/ 
(firm) innovation on the one hand and addressing grand and global challenges” on 
the other is found in the rationale report, where it is phrased in terms of policies’ 
different centres of gravity. It is, according to the report, “artificial to separate 
economic, social and environmental opportunities since they all involve business, 
government and other stakeholders» (p. 36). However, the economic, environmental 
and social “spheres” may, for “convenience of discussion”, may be categorized in 
terms of different “centres of gravity”: “It is artificial to separate economic, social and 
environmental opportunities since they all involve business, government and other 
stakeholders. However, for convenience of discussion we could categorise them by 
their centre of gravity.” (Rationale report, p.36).  
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If the relationship between economic and social (and environmental) objectives in 
challenge-driven policies cannot then be articulated as disjunctive opposites, it may, 
and often is, inversely be depicted as a relationship of confluence and mutual 
support, This is most saliently found in the “challenge as (business) opportunity” 
figure that pervade in particular EU policy documents following the official 
incorporation of the idea of grand challenge-driven R&I policies. That figure was 
prominent in the Lund declaration, if more explicitly so in background documents and 
discussions than in the letter of the declaration. It also pervades the background 
document to the Innovation Union (“Rationales for action”, (SEC(2010) 1161 final), 
see e.g.: “Research and innovation have a critical role to play in the creation of 
economic prosperity and the resolution of major societal challenges, and win-win 
policies designed to stimulate the economy and tackle major societal challenges are 
both viable and desirable.» (p. 6). “The key therefore, is to mobilise resources at EU 
and global levels to tackle major societal challenges through investment in research 
and innovation, seeking win-win situations by focusing on areas where both market 
potential and the need to 
resolve major societal 
challenges are greatest.” 
(p.10). It also sustains, 
e.g., the EU Green 
paper on the CSF for EU 
R&I funding (COM 
(20011) 48), where the 
intimate link between 
challenge and (busi-
ness, research) oppor-
tunity is encapsulated in 
its very title: “From 
Challenges to Oppor-
tunities”. “Challenges 
such as our ageing 
population or our depen-
dence on fossil fuel do, 
however, also provide 
powerful opportunities to 
develop innovative 
products and services, 
creating growth and jobs 
in Europe.» (p. 3) The 
Horizon 2020 communi-
cation calls for “a strong 
focus on creating busi-
ness opportunities out of 
our response to the 
major concerns common 
to people in Europe and beyond, i.e. ‘societal challenges’” (COM(2011) 808 final, p. 
4).  
In conclusion, in grand (and global) challenges approaches, the relationship 
between, the combination, alignment and mix of economic, environmental and social 
objectives is a complex one – it is a relationship of difference (in emphasis), of 
combination, confluence and overlap, making it impossible to mark the exact 
Box 7: 
The VERA stock-taking exercise revealed certain 
conflicting issues especially in the overall 
“philosophy” on how certain challenges are to be 
tackled. On the one hand there is the classic 
“growth” rhetoric based on competitiveness and 
growth of the neo-classical paradigm. This approach 
sees climate change and sustainability challenges 
for example as an opportunities for new businesses. 
The major concern is Europe’s lagging behind 
against its main competitors and emerging new 
economies and new technologies are seen and 
discussed with regard to competitiveness. The 
economy is a very prominent area among the areas 
exposed to grand challenges. The EU 
competitiveness always relates to the EU’s position 
in the world and how the EU economy will perform in 
the future competing with emerging economies as 
well as with traditional great powers. 
On the other hand, there are the advocates of new 
economic and business models that are socially and 
ecologically responsible. This approach calls for 
paradigm changes such as changing production and 
consumption patterns as well as societal values and 
ultimately acknowledges the limits to growth in a 
world of finite natural resources. 
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boundary where growth and innovation policies end and challenge-addressing 
policies start. This does not, however, dissolve the differences between them, 
whether they is phrased in terms of relative emphasis on social and economic 
objectives respectively, in the different roles of public, civic and private partners, in 
the relative emphasis on public and private goods/services as output, etc.  
The salient “challenge as opportunity” figure built into the grand challenge approach 
may be seen to provide one perspective for assessing specific challenge-driven 
initiatives in terms of their innovation/co-optation mix and balance: do they really, 
and in what specific ways, represent new and innovative ways to address challenges 
or do they appear to be not much more than more appealing wrappings of research 
and business activities vying, as always, for additional resources and conducive 
conditions on their own terms? 
Box 8: 
The analysis of Finnish STI documents suggests interestingly that the themes, 
which could be considered as global, were primarily treated from the perspective 
of national interests.  This means that while e.g. climate change and ageing are 
identified as global trends, they are not reacted from this perspective. The 
priority is usually given to the competitiveness of the country and to the 
necessary changes needed in social structures to keep welfare state up and 
running.  
The orientation is instrumental. For instance, Tekes concluded in 2005 on 
environmental change: “Sustainable development is a driver that creates and 
shapes global markets. It also represents changes in the relative costs of 
production factors and thus market opportunities for those who react quickly. It 
emphasises an environmentally sound approach and eco-efficiency, but also 
includes human aspects and sustainable economic growth on environmental and 
social terms.“ (Tekes 2005, 5) Research and Innovation Council stated a couple 
of years earlier: ”The main challenge for economic and societal development, in 
conditions of growing global competition, is to be able to keep Finland sufficiently 
attractive to business and jobs and as a living environment in general. Apart from 
the international challenges, there are a number of domestic issues to be 
addressed. Faced with an ageing population and the ensuing pressures for 
taxation, Finland will have to secure welfare services, to curtail unemployment, 
which is still high in the aftermath of the recession, and to solve other problems 
relating to human and social development. Employment rates must be raised 
and regional development balanced.” (Research and Innovation Council 2003, 
abstract) 
Noteworthy is that these problems or “challenges” are usually seen 
predominantly as business opportunities. While the perspective in the latest 
strategies becomes broader including also wellbeing and health, the business 
motif is the dominating perspective. For instance, climate change is both a 
boundary condition and an opportunity for the business. Likewise: “The ageing of 
the population issues a number of social, educational and economic challenges, 
while the growing number of senior citizens with more spending power also 
creates significant business opportunities. It is important to be able to provide 
developing living and housing environments, pharmaceuticals, equipment and 
services to enable better living conditions. The independent life-management of 
people and the efficiency of services must also be promoted.“ (Tekes 2002, 7)  
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The extensive overlap between “social” challenge-driven policies and firm-oriented 
innovation policies and the extent to which the one may be seen to shade into the 
other appears to be particularly evident in the similarities between challenge-driven 
innovation policy on the one hand and demand-side firm-oriented innovation policy 
on the other. In economic terms, demand is a primary policy driver in challenge-
driven policies; while innovation policies assigned to the “economic sphere” (cfr. 
rationale report) have had a strong supply-side bias, this bias is redressed 
somewhat by the inclusion of demand-side instruments/elements, such as “lead 
market initiatives” and public procurement. In both challenge-driven policies and 
demand-oriented innovation policies, government and public agencies (and budgets) 
play a key role, albeit with slightly different rationales: while challenge-driven policies 
require that public actors (and resources) take the lead in guiding the search for 
solutions to  specific problems and satisfy specific unmet needs, demand-side 
policies intervene actively in markets to create demand for innovative products and 
services, with the explicit (main?) intention to develop market conditions that may 
enable innovative firms to emerge and grow. Thus, only a blurred line can be drawn 
between demand-driven innovation policy on the one hand and challenge-driven R&I 
policy on the other, the one shading into the other as, e.g., procurement and the role 
of public demand is increasingly emphasized in the latter as a means to create 
opportunities and markets for innovative firms, that is, to create an “innovation-
friendly market/society” conducive to innovative firms, as much as it is a way to solve 
public problems and meeting public needs.  
 
It will also be impossible to evade issues of goal alignment and conflict between 
various “societal” goals, not only with economic. Given the comprehensive scope of 
all relevant challenges, indicating that it is not possible to target one challenge 
without taking into account how actions to resolve one challenge may impinge on 
others. Conflicts may surface between efforts to reduce climate gas release and 
actions to alleviate poverty and extreme inequalities, policies for increasing clean 
energy production may turn out to be in conflict with food security objectives etc.  
 
9. Orientation and steering. The many interdependencies and extensive overlap 
between societal and economic objectives in (many) challenge-driven policies 
notwithstanding, a key difference between policies to address challenges and 
policies to sustain (overall) economic growth, is that the former involve some degree 
and form of steering of efforts towards a specific mission or objective. While the EU 
Rationale report emphasized that the difference between challenge-driven and 
economy/growth-oriented policies is one of emphasis rather than nature, it noted that 
for R&I policies which address grand challenges  within the environmental and/or 
social spheres, “for most of these the drive will have to come from governments” (p. 
37). Similarly, the accompanying “rationale for action” document to the EU 
Innovation Union communication states that the overall orientation of challenge-
oriented and supply-oriented R&I policies differ by the fact that addressing 
challenges “involves placing a far greater emphasis than hitherto on attempts to 
influence the direction rather than the rate of technical change and innovation.“ 
(SEC(2010) 1161 final, p. 26). The centrality of the difference in this dimension 
between challenge-driven and innovation-oriented R&I is particularly strongly 
emphasized in Weber et al, 2012 (see above). That difference may also be phrased 
in terms of a difference, potentially even an opposition, between directive and 
facilitative (innovation) policies.  
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10. Interactional mode (collaboration/competition). One dimension along which R&I 
policies to address challenges may differ from R&I policies to sustain economic 
growth and the competiveness of firms and national economies, may be in their 
different emphasis on collaboration and competition respectively, e.g., in a stronger 
emphasis in challenge-oriented policies to develop policies and deploy  resources 
within formal collaborative frameworks (organizations, programmes) at the supra-
national level, while in a national framework for developing R&I policies concerns 
with the competitiveness of the national economy will be strong. Schematically, while 
competition may be deployed in the service of collaboration in the GC approach, 
defined by search for common solutions through international collaboration, while the 
reverse may be the case in policies for growth and competitiveness within national 
(and regional) frameworks to support the interests and capability of the “own” actors 
(economy, firms, researchers). This tension will come to the fore in i.a., issues of 
“(juste) retour” and IPR. 
 
11. STI spectrum. Lastly, one important dimension along which policy initiatives to 
address some grand and global challenge may differ widely from each other is the 
relative “location(s)” of actions along the STI spectrum – from basic, 
oriented/strategic and applied research over development on demonstration to 
innovation commercialisation or effective resolution of the challenge in question. 
While schemes for collaboration in research is well developed, few collaborative 
models exist at the “innovation” part of the spectrum (except within contexts of 
development, aid and philanthropy), where concerns of commercialisation, market 
return, competition and protection of intellectual property often prevail. Hence, this is 
also where tensions between concerns with effective collaborative challenge-
orientation and search for opportunities for (national) business may surface acutely, 
and where it may be most difficult to get balance and mix between collaboration and 
competition right (see dimension 5 above).  
 
The strong emphasis on “resolving” challenges may indicate that efforts at the 
innovation end of the spectrum may be mandatory in any “complete” challenge-
oriented policy, as neither new knowledge nor new technologies can in themselves 
be expected to resolve any major issue/challenge.  
 
12. Stakeholder involvement. While the political authority and the privileged access to 
resources of governments and national and international agencies and organizations 
put them in key positions in the organization, funding and implementation of 
challenge-oriented initiatives, addressing challenges through R&I is nowhere seen to 
appropriately organized through top-down steering and hierarchical organisations 
Box 6: 
It is interesting to note that in the discussions about the ways and approaches 
that should be adopted in dealing with grand challenges in the documents 
studied under the VERA project the notion of ‘users’ is given a more active tone. 
Users are addressed as important stakeholders that should get involved actively 
at the outset in the discussions about how to deal with grand challenges. In this 
regard ‘users’ may also mean ‘co-producers’1, or ‘co-innovators’1. This may also 
reflect emerging trends towards different types of production like peer production 
(Benckler, 2006) or open innovation (Chesbrough, 2003) or user-driven 
innovation (von Hippel, 1986). 
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structures. While the notion of “partnerships” are becoming common as a venue also 
for addressing grand and global challenges, these partnerships are conceived as 
having to be particularly extensive, inclusive and heterogeneous (in contrast to, e.g., 
the Triple Helix structure of partnerships for “the knowledge-based economy”). 
Statements along the line of the following abound: “Nevertheless, some common 
strategies are emerging: greater involvement of the private sector, non-governmental 
organisations, philanthropic organisations, and other stakeholders in the prioritisation 
and delivery of science and innovation …. They call for closer involvement of the 
developing world and a build-up of these countries’ research and technology 
capacity.” (OECD, 2010: 181). It is an issue of “empowering new players”: “Non-
governmental organisations, private, often philanthropic, foundations and social 
entrepreneurs which often are driven by non-profit motives can play an important 
role in catalysing innovation to solve social problems that are insufficiently 
addressed by governments or the market.” (ibid).  
 
13. Governance. Having listed above some relevant “dimensions” for characterising and 
assessing challenge-driven R&I separately, one may need a category for describing 
how each challenge-oriented policy “item” combines and configures its “solutions” to 
the issues indicated by these dimensions. In this regard, Upham et al (2013) argue 
that the assumption of collective, collaborative steering of socio-technical change 
found in transition management thinking accords well with the governance themes 
explicit and implicit in grand challenge discourses. Although there is diversity in 
these discourses (Giesecke and Warnke, 2013), themes of integration, systems 
thinking and inclusive decision-making are typically evident. Transition management 
appeals to concepts of complex adaptive systems, social learning, co-evolution, 
adaptive capacity and self-organising networks (Loorbach, 2007), which involve 
varying degrees of societal involvement and co-operation.   
Towards a matrix for benchmarking challenge-driven R&I policies? 
Through our selective and cursory overview of a few cases and aspects of the international 
development of R&I policies framed in terms of addressing grand and global challenges, we 
find then a number of recurring issues and dimensions that will have to be included in 
framing, implementing and assessing what may be – or become – a novel type of R&I policy. 
They are defined by the much higher stakes (2) involved in resolving such challenges than 
“normal” in regular public, mission-oriented and national R&I policies. Their scope (3) is also 
far more extensive than that of “regular” issues and problems; they affect (almost) “everyone 
in the world”, and reflect in that respect the increasing interdependence of nations and 
regions caused by rapid processes of globalization and internationalisation. The increasing 
stakes and scope of such challenges also requires that a higher level of efforts, of intellectual 
and material resources (4) needs to be mobilised for the challenges to be adequately 
addressed and effectively resolved. This implies that resources need to be pooled and 
efforts effectively coordinated, providing a specific and strong rationale for (some form of 
formalized) international collaboration and coordination (3 [10]). While R&I policies for 
(overall) economic growth has during this time been increasingly been developed in 
response to the effects of economic globalization, these policies have been framed in terms 
of ensuring that national economies and firms may survive in an increasingly competitive 
global(ized) economy, the challenges approach call for collaborative efforts (10) across 
national borders. It is generally accepted that the grand and global challenges that this type 
of R&I policies address are of a social or societal nature (8), but in a sense where social and 
economic objectives combine, and political, civic and commercial actors collaborate in 
variable and complex configurations, calling for multi-objective policies where goal alignment 
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and the balancing of potentially conflicting policy objectives are necessary. Hence, a 
requirement for some form and degree of steering and direction (9) must be ineradicably 
built into in any challenge-driven policies, indication that a kind of “market failure” need to be 
addressed which requires different (or at least additional) directional incentives and/or 
articulation of demand and user needs than those which emanate from the market. 
Addressing challenges means doing more than scientific research and technology 
development, it is, at the end of the day, about making an impact on the “real world”, i.e., at 
the “innovation” end of the STI spectrum (13). However, as the conditions for effective 
“innovation” will often differ widely from normal market conditions, and the concept of 
innovation has, as Benoit Godin in particular has shown, become intimately associated 
within R&I policy contexts with the successful commercialisation of products and services, 
one should perhaps look for a different term and concept for innovation in challenge-oriented 
policy contexts. 5  
Policy initiatives, programmes etc may in principle be descriptively characterised in terms of 
how each dimensions listed is reflected in that policy “item’s” framing and organisation. 
Along at least some of the dimensions listed items may also – also in principle – be assigned 
normative “more-or-less” or “strong-or-weak” values. While normative interpretations and 
uses of the dimensions have many pitfalls, normativity is nevertheless explicitly built into the 
grand and global challenge discourse itself, so the normative use may be justified from within 
and not applied from the outside, on the basis of criteria selected according to some political, 
personal or theoretical “preference”. They should address grand challenges, not small 
problems, they address challenges of global, not national or regional, scope, addressing 
these challenges effectively requires that large, huge, efforts and resources are mobilised, 
that collaboration and coordination be improved, etc etc. So assigning to individual policy 
“items” “high/low” or “strong/weak” values along (some of) these dimensions , may reflect 
and make explicit normative criteria built into the grand and global challenge discourse itself. 
If some policy “item” comes out with “low/weak” values on the stakes, scale and scope 
dimensions, if it is located close to the national and far from the international collaboration 
end, if is peripheral in thematic centrality, if concerns are all on the effects on firms’ 
innovative capacity and relaxed on effective mission resolution, if it is all about research and 
nothing about “innovation” and so on, then such “benchmarking” may provide some basis for 
critical assessment of policies framed and developed in terms of (contributing) to the 
resolution of grand and global challenges. Of course, with all the necessary caveats and 
cautionary notes.  
 
                                                     
5 As, e.g., suggested in OECD, 2010: 182:  «Traditional innovation concepts and models are inadequate for 
distinguishing socially driven innovation from profit-driven innovation. The small size and fragmentation of 
markets for social goods also discourage firms from investing in and committing resources to these areas. 
This does not mean that socially and economically oriented innovation are necessarily at odds. They can in 
fact be complementary, but this will require changes to the way policy makers promote innovation, for 
example by involving stakeholders so as to link social demands with research agendas.” 
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